A Study On Corporate Governance And Performance Effect Of Institutional Investors by Min, Cheng
European Scientific Journal June 2016 edition vol.12, No.16  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
363 
A Study On Corporate Governance And Performance 
Effect Of Institutional Investors 
 
 
 
Cheng Min 
SHU-UTS SILC Business School, Shanghai University,  
Shanghai, P.R.China 
 
doi: 10.19044/esj.2016.v12n16p363    URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.19044/esj.2016.v12n16p363 
 
Abstract 
 Recently with rapid growth of China's institutional investors, they are 
gradually becoming the dominant force in capital market. At the same time 
they start exerting influence on corporate governance and affecting corporate 
performance. Many previous studies have shown institutional investors’ 
holdings are positively correlated to corporate performance. However there 
are still many studies holding opposite opinions. This article further studies 
how institutional investors influence corporate performance and whether 
they have effects on corporate governance. On the whole, we come to the 
conclusion that participation of institutional investors promotes the 
improvement of corporate performance. These conclusions provide 
theoretical and practical guidance to future development of institutional 
investors. 
 
Keywords: Institutional Investors, Corporate Performance, Corporate 
Governance 
 
1. Introduction 
 With the continuous development of world economy and increasing 
scale of capital market, market investment participants are gradually 
increasing and structural changes and transitions begin to occur. One of the 
most prominent performances is the rapid development of the institutional 
investors. At present, institutional investors have gradually grown into a 
dominant force in the developed capital market. The main purpose of 
developing institutional investors is to improve capital market efficiency. 
Many economists have proposed that the development of institutional 
investors contributes to appearance of bull market   in the nineties, which had 
brought economic growth for almost ten years in the United States. 
 After foreign developed capital markets put forward  the idea about 
development of institutional investors, the Chinese governments also 
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encourage the development of institutional investors, and provide convenient  
conditions in order to give full play to their own advantages, as well as to 
promote stable， standardized and mature development of Chinese capital 
market. Since 1990s, Chinese institutional investors have been developing 
rapidly. These institutions also exhibit diversification patterns, such 
as Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII), securities investment 
funds, insurance companies, securities companies, social security fund and 
trust companies. Although there is still big gap in the extent of institutional 
investors’ development between China and foreign developed countries, 
relative to  individual investors, institutional investors have more 
professional knowledge and information advantages. The rapid rising of this 
investment group would exert great influence in market valuation 
and enterprises development. 
 With the rapid growing of the institutional investors, academics and 
regulators begin to pay close attention to market effects of institutional 
investors. 
 Compared with individual investors, institutional investors 
theoretically have strong capital strength, abundant information access, 
greater professional information analysis capability, better risk consciousness 
and strict risk management ability. From long-term practical operation in the 
capital market, institutional investors often earn a stable return.  Institutional 
investors provide an important reference for individual 
investors. Hence Governments introduced a series of policies to encourage 
and support the development of institutional investors, aiming to 
use institutional investors’ advantages to guide the market investment 
behavior, reduce the unstable factors, so as to help long-term, stable 
development of capital market. 
 Although the development course of Chinese institutional investors is 
short, its growth rate is amazing. Institutional investors in China have been 
playing played a very important role. Chinese institutional investors are 
actively involved in corporate governance. They constitute effective restraint 
to listed companies and help companies improve performance. But Chinese 
institutional investors are not as much mature, and need further improvement 
in participating in the process, ways and motivations of corporate 
governance. Conducting research about the impact of institutional investors’ 
holdings on companies’ performance has certain theoretical and practical 
significance. First, to some extent enrich and improve studies of institutional 
investors' role in corporate governance. And the research results can provide 
effective theoretical basis for relevant government bodies to guide 
institutional investors’ development. Second, this study tries to solve 
Chinese long-standing corporate governance problems from the new 
perspective of institutional investors, and to promote the healthy and orderly 
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development of the corporate governance structure, to form real corporate 
governance which plays an important role in enhancing economic 
effectiveness of the company. 
 Although it is well known that institutional investors make value 
investment based on corporate performance, whether investors can really 
participate in corporate governance and to improve corporate performance 
still need Time to test. In order to  stabilize capital market, Stimulate stock 
market trading activity, improve corporate governance and performance of 
listed companies, it is necessary for Chinese regulators to further 
investigate investment behavior of institutional investors and their 
influence,  and then to provide a more reasonable  basis for establishment of 
laws and regulations system to guide institutional Investors.Enhancing more 
scientific investment philosophy and more rational investment behavior, 
motivating them to participate in corporate governance, strengthening their 
motivation to improve company performance so as to promote the steady 
development of China's securities market.As for institutional investors have 
investment behavior impact on corporate value, studies on institutional 
investors are essential and very important for the healthy development of 
Chinese capital market. 
 
2. Literature review 
 Compared with social investors and individual investors, institutional 
investors have more professional knowledge reserves and abundant capital 
strength. In theory, they should more actively supervise daily operation and 
management activities of listed companies in order to improve the whole 
company performance levels. In recent years, along with the continuous 
theoretical development of active shareholders ideology, more and 
more scholars carry out the research of the influence of institutional investors 
on corporate performance. However, scholars have not yet agreed with the 
exact relationship between institutional investors’ participation and corporate 
performance. There are still bigger divergences in relevant theoretical and 
empirical research conclusions for this problem. These research conclusions 
mainly focus on three aspects: one is that   institutional investors can 
improve corporate performance. Secondly, institutional investors can’t 
distinctively promote corporate performance. Third, institutional investors’ 
holding does not have any effect on corporate performance promotion. 
 
2.1 literature reviews that institutional investors can improve corporate 
performance 
 Studies that get the conclusion that institutional investors can 
improve corporate performance are based on an important hypothesis----
effective Monitoring hypothesis. The hypothesis is first put forward by 
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economic researcher Shleifer and Vishny. These two economists pointed out 
that in contrast with other types of shareholders, institutional investors have 
theoretical and professional knowledge which can greatly save cost 
of supervision. Along with more abundant capital, driven by benefits 
maximum motivation, institutional investors can earn greater returns by 
actively fulfilling supervision responsibilities. With this research hypothesis, 
Shleifer and Vishny concluded that there is significantly positive correlation 
between insititutional ownership and corporate performance. 
 With the passage of time, many western scholars' studies support the 
effective supervision hypothesis.Many researchers had made more in-depth 
studies on the corporate governance role of institutional investors (Bensten 
and Smith,1976; Grossman and Hart, 1980;and Gillan and 
Starks,  2001).They have commonly found that institutional investors 
holdings have positive correlation with corporate performance. That means 
the higher institutional investors holdings, the stronger influence on 
corporate performance. Institutional investors earn higher return by 
supervising companies, which further leads to more capabilities in 
monitoring daily operation and management activities of behavior. 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) collected 1000 listed companies as samples 
to study institutional investors. They use Tobin Q as a representative of 
market value to Study future influence of institutional investors on corporate 
performance. Research results show that the regression coefficient of 
institutional investors’ holdings on corporate performance is significantly 
positive. Thus they come to the conclusion that institutional investors 
effectively fulfill companies’ supervision. 
 Chaganti (1995) used return on assets to represent the performance of 
listed companies and found that institutional investors’ ownership and 
corporate performance is significantly related. 
 Short&Keasey(1997) pointed out that institutional investors actively 
participate in companies’ daily operation and management to improve long-
term performance. They found institutional investors holding is significantly 
correlated with corporate performance. Thus institutional investors holding 
behavior can improve the performance of the company. 
 
2.2 Literature reviews institutional investors have no distinctive 
promotion on corporate performance 
 Pound(1988) studied the relationship between institutional investor 
ownership and corporate performance. He put forward Interest Conflict 
Hypothesis and strategic alliance Hypothesis (or Negative monitoring 
Hypothesis). the view of interest conflict hypothesis means that institutional 
investors not only has its ownership in listed companies, but also may have 
other for-profit business transactions with these companies. That means 
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Institutional investors are related parties of these companies. Therefore, they 
are more likely to vote for managers in violation of corporate interest. As for 
strategic alliance hypothesis, institutional investors and the management of 
listed companies form an alliance, which is profitable for both parties. This 
mutual cooperation can severely damage institutional investors’ enthusiasm 
of participation in corporate governance and supervision of corporate 
management, which furthermore leads to the reduction of corporate value. 
Based on these analyses, the relationship between institutional investors and 
corporate performance showed significant negative correlation. Many 
scholars’ studies also support this conclusion. 
 Coffee（1991）and Bamard（1992）also agreed with the inefficient 
supervision idea of institutional investors that is the typical representative of 
this hypothesis. Coffee and Banard believed that institutional investors had 
not played an active role in the process of improving corporate governance. 
They pointed out that in essence institutional investors cater for financial 
market to make speculative trading. Because of their negative evaluation to 
speculative motivation of institutional investors, the management of listed 
companies is not friendly, even hostile to institutional investors. Hence to a 
larger extent these factors hindered institutional investors to play its role in 
effective supervision of listed companies, which is known as internal barriers 
to effective monitoring. Institutional investors may be confined to its own 
capital market operation and is lack of related professional knowledge in 
other fields. Due to not enough comprehensive knowledge level, many 
scholars doubt institutional investors’ holdings bring benefits for listed 
companies. Lipton and Rosenblum(1991), and Wohlstetter(1993) pointed out 
that although institutional investors have relative professional and 
information advantages, they are not enough  capable of business operation 
and management. Lack of management technical and effective experience 
involved in corporate governance, they are not able to really take part in 
company supervision and Management decisions. 
 Because of focusing too much on short-term investment return, 
institutional investors ultimately damage long-term goal of listed companies. 
Romano devoted to collecting related literature about corporate governance 
effect of institutional investors. He eventually found that many scholars 
theoretically hold positive evaluation to institutional investors. But 
practically and empirically their research conclusions stand on the opposite. 
Most scholars suggest active influence of institutional investors on corporate 
performance is very small; some even will be up against. 
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2.3 Literature review that institutional investors have no effect on 
corporate performance 
 Ineffective supervision hypothesis shows that institutional investors 
have no significant positive or negative influence on corporate governance 
and corporate performance. In other words institutional investors’ holdings 
cannot exert any effect on companies’ daily business activities. Wahal 
(1996) studied corporate governance effect of pension fund. He found that 
pension funds did not significant influence corporate performance in the 
process of participating in corporate governance effect. Ring.Smith (1996) 
analyzed 51 listed companies with institutional investors holding for six 
years from 1987 to 1993. He found that institutional investors help improve 
corporate share price by participating in corporate governance, but they have 
no significant impact on corporate performance in statistics. Guercio and 
Hawkins (1999) came to the conclusion that institutional investors’ holding 
does not show significantly positive or negative impact on long-term 
corporate returns. To sum up, institutional investors holding behavior can not 
affect corporate performance. 
 In foreign western developed countries institutional investors start 
early and develop faster, correspondingly related literature about the effect of 
institutional investors on corporate performance are relatively mature and 
deep in research extent. many scholars put forward some related theories and 
hypothesis, but there still no consensus on this issue.Because of relatively 
later development of Chinese domestic institutions investors, related studies 
must be characteristic of Chinese practical conditions.  
 Chinese Domestic scholars have been studying institutional investors 
for some time and have achieved some instructive results. But these studies 
still need further improvement in research methods and research depth and 
profundity as well. Most Chinese domestic scholars study the effect of 
institutional investors holding on the performance of listed companies. But 
there exists some problems in research methods such as selection of 
variables and the treatment of endogenous issues. The mechanisms how the 
intervention of institutional investors affects corporate performance still need 
theoretical and empirical explanations. This study tries to overcome these 
research flaws from two aspects. The first is to introduce tools of variables to 
solve endogenous problems. The second is trying to explain corporate 
performance effects of institutional investors from corporate governance 
perspective. 
 
3. Research Hypothesis 
 The influence of institutional investors on corporate performance is 
mainly embodied in the process of participation in internal corporate 
governance as well as through external flow mechanism in the equity market. 
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From the point of view of internal corporate governance structure, 
institutional investors as an important member of the shareholders participate 
in corporate governance in three ways such as the general meeting of 
shareholders, the board of directors and board of supervisors. On the general 
meeting of shareholders, institutional investors’ agents attend the general 
meeting of shareholders comment on and give advice for the operation and 
management decision-making of listed companies. Usually this situation 
through shareholders’ meeting is suitable for larger institutional investors’ 
holdings.  
 Institutional investors can also exert their influence by the board of 
directors. Institutional investors can act as members of board of directors of 
listed companies. Their agents as directors often participate in business 
operation, financial, personnel and strategic management decisions of listed 
companies. At the same time, these directors as corporate insiders monitor 
daily behavior of corporate management, which greatly improves 
supervision efficiency and reduces agency costs arising from information 
asymmetry between principal and management. In addition, with the 
supervision mechanism of the board of directors, institutional investors can 
effectively curb collusion behaviors between large shareholders, and 
between large shareholders and corporate managers, and effectively protect 
interests of minority shareholders as well. Similarly, institutional investors 
can take advantage of the board of supervisors to supervise corporate 
governance structure and improve corporate governance quality.  
 Institutional investors affect corporate performance goals by 
participating in corporate external governance are mainly involved in market 
mechanism of equity flows. The main ways are embodied in the securities 
market pricing mechanism and control rights contests. As for securities 
market pricing mechanism, institutional investors "vote by feet" through 
observing and forecasting shares’ prices of listed companies. That means 
they purchase and sell shares, change corporate management and attract new 
investors based on their own profit maximization principle. These market 
behaviors of institutional investors to a certain extent threaten interests of 
management, which would force them conscientiously work hard to improve 
corporate performance and keep securities market prices stable. Given that 
institutional investors can influence corporate performance through internal 
and external dual mechanisms, we believe that in order to obtain higher 
returns and protect their own interests, institutional investors will improve 
corporate performance by participating corporate governance. 
 In China the phenomenon that majority shareholders dominate listed 
companies is widespread. Under this condition, institutional investors are 
difficult to contend against controlling shareholders. They often passively 
participate in corporate governance resulting in weak supervision. But there 
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are still many studies showing that Chinese institutional investors have 
participated in the corporate governance and played an important role in the 
supervision of the companies’ business operations. Relying on their equity 
held, institutional investors can change equity structure of listed companies, 
and monitor majority shareholders and corporate management. They can also 
improve corporate internal governance mechanisms such as hiring outside 
independent directors to change the structure and governance efficiency of 
the board of directors. Therefore, this paper argues that to some extent 
Chinese institutional investors participate in corporate governance. The 
higher their stakes in listed companies, the greater they will help to improve 
corporate performance. Therefore, we put forward the research hypothesis 1. 
 Hypothesis 1: as institutional investors’ holdings increase, the 
company will have better performance. 
 With highly concentrated ownership structure of Chinese listed 
companies, majority shareholders often take a series of moves to damage the 
interests of minority shareholders. Institutional investors’ participation in 
corporate governance can avoid free-riding behavior of minority 
shareholders. Institutional investors not only play the role of supervision, but 
also possibly cooperate with large shareholders to improve corporate 
governance. Through participating in corporate daily management and 
improving corporate governance, institutional investors curb “interest 
tunneling effect” of large shareholders to protect the interests of small and 
medium-sized shareholders. As a result, relative to the large shareholders, 
the higher institutional investors’ holding, their voting in the general 
shareholder meeting is more influential. Of course, this kind of influence is 
also relative to the big shareholders. Based on relative restrictedness strength 
of institutional investors, we believe that institutional investors could 
improve corporate governance and promote corporate performance. 
Therefore we put forward  
 Hypothesis 2: the higher the counterbalance between the largest 
shareholder and institutional investors, the company would perform 
better. 
 After years of reform, most Chinese state-owned enterprises have 
established modern enterprise system. But to some extent the government 
still intervenes in corporate management and decisions. In present Chinese 
political, economic and social structures, the government remains in the 
leadership and strong position. In order to realize multiple development 
goals of government, the production and business operation of state holding 
companies often deviate from the interests of other small and medium 
shareholders. The combination between state shareholder holding position 
and strong governance strength makes it difficult to implement all kinds of 
corporate governance mechanisms. Correspondingly it also increase the cost 
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and difficulty of institutional investors participating in corporate governance. 
Hence state controlling inhibits corporate governance effect of institutional 
investors. Relative to state owned companies, in non-state-owned 
companies’ institutional investors can be better qualified for the role of 
supervisors and can more effectively improve the level of corporate 
governance and corporate performance. Therefore, we put forward research 
hypothesis 3. 
 Hypothesis 3: relative to state-owned listed companies, in non-
state-owned companies institutional investors can more significantly 
influence corporate performance. 
 
4. Research Design 
4.1 Data source and sample selection 
 In this article, all samples are selected from Chinese CSMAR 
database. We choose companies listed in Chinese main market from 2012 to 
2014 and perform the following sample selecting processes: (1)to exclude 
companies without institutional participation;(2) to exclude companies with 
debt ratio greater than 1; (3) to eliminate companies in the financial industry; 
(4) to eliminate the industry with sample size less than 10. (5) To delete data 
sample with lack of variable value and incurrence of abnormal value.With 
the above selecting standard, we get total 5941 sample companies distributed 
in 10 industries during 3 years from 2012 to 2014. 
 
4.2 Variables definition 
Dependent variables 
 Corporate performance evaluation method is appropriate evaluation 
and judgment of companies’ operating results, financial position and 
economic performance considering various factors affecting corporate 
performance. From the point of view of the existing literature, corporate 
performance evaluation methods mainly include: Dupont analytical method, 
proportional method, the economic Value added (EVA), the balanced 
scorecard method and Tobin Q value method. In this article, we use Tobin Q 
value and some main financial indicators to comprehensively evaluate 
corporate performance. Some scholars adopt a variety of financial indicators 
to systematically evaluate corporate performance, such as return on equity 
(ROE), return on total assets (ROA), profitability from main business 
operation, total asset growth rate. But because these financial indicators 
reflect on company historical performance effect, to some extent they are 
unreasonable to evaluate corporate performance.  
 In this paper, performance indicators selection adheres to common 
theoretical points and use comprehensive performance measures such as 
Tobin Q value, earnings per share (EPS) and return on equity (ROE). The 
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reasons for selecting above three indicators to reflect corporate performance 
are as follows. (1) Earnings per share (EPS) is the most explicit indicator 
reflecting profitability. It indicates what common shareholders can get from 
corporate earnings. EPS provides significant ground for dividend 
distribution. EPS indicator eliminates the factor influence of corporate size 
and provides an important basis for shareholders’ investment decisions. (2) 
Return on equity (ROE) is a comprehensive and strong representative 
financial indicator. It is also one of the core components of enterprise 
performance evaluation. It can not only reflect the enterprise Profitability, 
but also is an integrated embodiment of business capital operation, sales 
scale, cost control, and financing structure etc. Since ROE shows the final 
result of business activities and capital investment profitability, we select it 
as a corporate performance evaluation indicator. (3) Tobin Q is the ratio of 
company’s market value to total asset replacement cost. It reflects the extent 
to which the company is recognized by capital market, and how it is valued 
by market evaluation. Based on this computation that Tobin Q equals the 
company's market value divided by its asset replacement cost, theoretically it 
is difficult to manipulate Tobin Q value. Hence we also use it to measure 
corporate performance. 
 
Independent variables 
 This paper selected three main independent variables to examine the 
role of institutional investors. 
 INS represents the proportion of institutional investors’ holding in 
listed companies. The higher the institutional investor's stake, their 
motivation to participate in corporate governance is greater .And 
correspondingly they will exert greater influence on companies’ 
performance. In this study we compute the total holdings of institutional 
investors among top ten shareholders. INT indicates the counterbalance 
between the largest shareholder and institutional investors. It is institutional 
investors’ holdings divided by the largest shareholder’ holding. The higher 
this proportion, institutional investors are more capable of counterbalancing 
authorities of the largest shareholders. At the same time, we expect that 
institutional investors are more involved in corporate governance and 
positively affect firm performance. 
 TYPE represents the ownership nature of controlling shareholders. 
TYPE is 1 for state holdings. Otherwise, it is zero. The nature of the 
controlling shareholder indicates whether the listed company is a state-
owned or non-state-owned holding. Usually as a result of state holding, state-
owned listed companies need to meet some requirements of the government. 
Because of government intervention and actual owners’ absence in state-
owned enterprises, it is difficult for institutional investors to participate in 
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enterprise’ management decision. Therefore, the role of institutional 
investors in non-state enterprises is relatively greater important than in state-
owned enterprises.so performance effect of institutional investors in these 
two types of companies will show the differences. 
Control variable 
 In order to accurately assess the role of institutional investors in 
corporate performance, we must strictly control other common variables that 
influence company performance. This study mainly considers the influence 
of the following control variables.  
 (1) LEV represents corporate solvency risk for the company. We use 
debt ratio to measure financial leverage risks. Generally speaking, when debt 
ratio is relatively lower, corporate value will increase with the rising of 
leverage ratio. Because of tax shield effects of debt interest expenses, the 
enterprise intends to use debt financing to improve shareholder returns. But 
if the debt ratio is too high, the company will face greater financial risk, 
which is harmful to business expansion and innovation  
  (2) GROWTH represents growth rate of main business operating 
revenue. It indicates corporate growth abilities. We use operating income 
changes (ending operating revenue minus beginning operating 
revenue)divided by beginning operating revenue to measure growth abilities. 
Due to corporate performance continuity, companies with higher growth 
rates tend to perform relatively well. 
 (3) SIZE represents corporate scale, which is measured by computing 
the natural logarithm of total assets. The greater the enterprise scale, the 
stronger the ability to resist risks. Correspondingly we expect higher 
operating stability for this company. 
 However, companies with larger scale may have complex business 
types, staff size and organization structure. Additionally with less flexible 
internal management mechanics, all these may have negative influence on 
governance efficiency of enterprises. As a result, it is difficult to determine 
the impact of corporate scale on corporate governance. In order to improve 
model accuracy and eliminate abnormal factors, this study also introduces a 
series of additional dummy variables, including auditing opinion, stock 
types, area development, industry, year, etc. Table 1 exhibits the definition of 
various variables.  
Table 1 Variables definitions 
 Variables Definitions 
Dependent 
variables 
EPS Net profit divided by common shares issued 
Tobin Q Corporate market value divided by asset replacement 
costs. 
ROE Net profit divided by average shareholders’ equity 
Independent 
variables 
INS The sum of institutional investors’ holdings among the 
top ten shareholders 
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CB The sum of institutional investors’ holdings divided by 
the largest shareholders’ holding 
STATE Dummy variable. 1 for state controlling, otherwise 0. 
Control 
variables 
HERF Herfindahl Index to reflect ownership concentration. 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets 
LEV Debt ratio. Total liability divided by total asset. 
GROWTH (ending operating revenue minus beginning operating 
revenue)/ beginning operating revenue 
OCCUPY (Receivables-payables)/total asset 
HB Dummy variable. 1 for companies with B or H shares, 
otherwise 0. 
AUDIT Dummy variable. 1 for companies audited by big four 
accounting firms. Otherwise 0. 
DEV Dummy variable. 1 for companies in eastern developed 
area. Otherwise 0. 
IND Control variable for different industry. 
YEAR Control variable for different year. 
 
4.3 Model specification 
 When making investment decisions, institutional investors tend to 
focus on corporate past operating performance and financial position. Hence 
endogenous problems may exist in examining the relationship between 
independent and dependent variables. That is to say, corporate performance 
improvement may not arise from the entering of institutional investors 
holding. If corporate performance improvement is influenced by its past 
performance, this endogenous problem will disturb our examination of 
institutional investors’ corporate role. This study uses two-stage least squares 
method to solve endogenous problem (Wooldridge, 2006). In the first stage, 
we regard institutional investor’s holdings as dependent variable affected by 
corporate governance factors and past corporate performance, and use Model 
1 to estimating the value of institutional investor’s holdings. In the second 
stage, we examine hypotheses using the estimated institutional holdings as 
independent variable. Thus, this method effectively avoids endogenous 
problem. To examine Hypothesis 1, 2 and 3, we use the following Model 2,3 
and 4 respectively. Dependent variable Performance represents ROE, EPS, 
and Tobin Q respectively. 
INS=α0+β1HERF+β2DEV+β3HB+β4OCCUPY+β5SIZE+β6GROWTH+β7
AUDIT+β8EPS+β9LEV+β10IND+ε (1) 
Performance=α0+β1INS+β2SIZE+β3GROWTH+β4AUDIT+β5LEV+β6IN
D+β7Year+ε  (2) 
Performance=α0+β1CB+β2SIZE+β3GROWTH+β4AUDIT+β5LEV+β6IND
+β7Year+ε  (3) 
Performance=α0+β1INS+β2INS*STATE++β3SIZE+β4GROWTH+β5AUDI
T+β6LEV+β7IND+β8Year+ε  (4) 
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5. Descriptive statistics  
 Since the development of institutional investors in China is not very 
long, it is necessary to investigate Institutional investors’ share holdings in 
the listed companies and their counterweight as for as restricting to the big 
shareholder. Table 2 shows the summary statistics results of all variables. 
From the table, the average institutional investors’ holding INS is as low as 
9.6%. Relatively lower institutional investors’ holding means initial 
development stage of institutional investors and limited influence they can 
exert on listed companies. The average value of variable CB is 0.186. 
Compared with large shareholders, this also indicates low degree of counter 
balance from institutional investors. To restraint entrenchment of corporate 
management and large shareholders, institutional investors play limited role 
in participating in corporate governance. In current Chinese capital market, 
there is still a long way for institutional investors to contend with major 
shareholders. Table 3 shows Pearson correlation coefficient test results of all 
variables. From table 3, we can see variable INS and CB are positively 
significantly correlated with performance variables EPS, Tobin Q and ROE. 
Although institutional investors’ holdings are relatively low compared with 
large shareholders, to some extent they can still exert. Form table 3, except 
variables INS and CB is highly correlated; the correlation coefficients 
between other explainable variables are not very significant. Hence 
multicollinearity problem of independent variables is not serious, and it will 
not disturb the following regression tests.  
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of all variables 
  Average Median Max Min Std.Dev 
EPS 0.348 0.265 14.58 -3.81 0.564 
Tobin Q 1.904 1.449 192.705 0.683 3.321 
ROE 0.069 0.007 2.091 -1.089 0.069 
INS 0.096 0.044 0.799 0.000 0.129 
CB 0.186 0.070 4.673 0.000 0.305 
STATE 0.427 0.000 1 0.000 0.494 
HERF 0.177 0.148 0.980 0.000 0.127 
SIZE 21.888 21.724 28.482 16.161 1.316 
LEV 0.454 0.442 13.397 -0.194 0.389 
GROWTH 0.222 0.110 36.753 -0.999 4.673 
OCCUPY -0.0299 -0.006 0.478 -9.984 0.216 
HB 0.069 0.000 1 0.000 0.254 
AUDIT 0.055 0.000 1 0.000 0.228 
DEV 0.616 1 1 0.000 0.486 
 
 
 
 
European Scientific Journal June 2016 edition vol.12, No.16  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
376 
Table 3 Pearson correlation coefficient test of all variables 
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25**
* 
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0.08
6*** 
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-
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03**
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41**
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-
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0.1
68**
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-
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-
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49**
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-
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* 
-
0.04
6*** 
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0.0
44*
* 
0.2
73**
* 
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* 
-
0.003 
-
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* 
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-
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* 
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* 
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* 
-
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0.007 0.4
56**
* 
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* 
-
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-
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-
0.02
0 
-
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23 
-
0.0
10 
-
0.0
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* 
0.015 0.035
*** 
0.0
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* 
0.0
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* 
1 
***significant at the 1% level   **significant at the 5% level   *significant at the 10% level 
 
6. Regression results and explanations 
 In model 1, INS is regarded as a dependent variable influenced by a 
series of tool variables. In the following regression examinations, 
independent variable INS is regression estimation result of the first stage by 
using model 1. Through two stages least squares regression, we eliminate 
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performance influences on institutional investors’ decision making. After 
solving this endogenous problem, we get very high fitting degree of 
regression models. In examining hypothesis 1, the regression coefficients of 
institutional investors holding on corporate performance of EPS, ROE and 
Tobin Q were significantly correlated exhibited in table 4. This suggests that 
institutional investors’ holding does have significant positive impact on 
corporate performance. Besides positive correlation between institutional 
investors holding and corporate performance, corporate scale variable SIZE 
is also significantly positively related with corporate performance EPS and 
ROE. However corporate scale SIZE is significantly negatively correlated 
with Tobin Q. It is likely that corporate performance increase is to some 
extent based on scale expansion. Market investors might think that some 
companies have the tendency of excessive expansion. Debt ratio as the 
representative of financial leverage is significantly negatively correlated with 
corporate performance ROE and EPS. It means that financial risks have 
negative impact on corporate performance. But debt ratio is significantly 
positively related with Tobin Q, and the market regards financial leverage as 
active signals. To sum up, the regression results support the hypothesis 1 
very well. 
Table 4 regression results of testing hypotheses 1 
      Dependent varaibles 
 
Independent variables 
ROE EPS Tobin Q 
 coefficient T value coefficient T value coefficient T value 
Constant -0.283*** -4.387 -0.103*** -5.870 22.206*** 22.840 
INS 0.482** 2.389 2.067*** 3.797 9.168*** 3.132 
SIZE 0.679** 2.218 0.056*** 6.729 -0.868*** -18.827 
GROWTH 0.001 1.552 0.001 0.660 0.001 -0.300 
AUDIT 0.143*** 9.550 0.143*** 3.547 -2.404*** -10.132 
LEV -0.010* -1.718 -0.001*** -8.679 0.024*** 22.133 
IND      Control Control Control 
Year  Control Control Control 
F-value 55.631 71.745    10.156 
Adj-R2 0.131 0.165 0.169 
***significant at the 1% level   **significant at the 5% level   *significant at the 10% level 
 
Table 5 is the regression results of examining hypothesis 2.The degree of 
counter balance between institutional ownership and the big shareholder is 
significantly positively correlated with corporate performance indicators 
ROE, EPS and Tobin Q. When institutional investors take big stakes in 
companies compared with the first large shareholder, this higher degree of 
counter balance will provide more incentive for institutional investors to 
participate in corporate governance, and monitor corporate daily operation 
and management activities. This is proved by the result that with higher 
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degree of counter balance, the companies perform better. Corporate scale 
SIZE is significantly positively related to financial performance indicators 
ROE and EPS. But corporate scale SIZE is significantly negatively related to 
Tobin Q. Market investors possibly believe that when company size is too 
large, corporate management level and facilities will fail to keep up with 
current scale and have damage to corporate value. As exhibited in table 5, 
the regression results support hypothesis 2 very well. 
Table 5 regression results of testing hypotheses 2 
      Dependent varaibles 
 
Independent variables 
ROE EPS Tobin Q 
 coefficient T value coefficient T value coefficient T value 
Constant -0.418*** -9.217 -1.577*** -12.960 20.389*** 29.272 
CB 0.161*** 8.399 0.824*** 16.075 2.437*** 8.495 
SIZE 0.007** 2.463 0.059*** 7.728 -0.777*** -16.698 
GROWTH 0.001 1.542 0.001 0.622 -0.002 -0.265 
AUDIT 0.143*** 9.705 0.143*** 3.682 -2.324*** -2.090 
LEV -0.01* -1.735 -0.139*** -8.822 2.364*** 22.820 
IND      Control Control Control 
Year  Control Control Control 
F-value 52.701 91.601 195.290 
Adj-R2 0.161 0.102 0.198 
***significant at the 1% level   **significant at the 5% level   *significant at the 10% level 
 
 Table 6 and table 7 are the regression results of examining hypothesis 
3.  We build cross-term INS*STATE that is institutional investors’ holding 
ratio multiplied by the nature of the controlling shareholders. In table 6, the 
coefficients of controlling shareholder nature is significantly negatively 
related to financial performance indicators EPS, ROE and Tobin Q. That 
means corporate performance in state-owned companies is relatively low 
compared with non-state-owned companies. This result also explains why 
Chinese governments are always devoted to reforming state-owned 
companies. In table 7, the regression coefficients of cross-term INS*STATE 
are all significantly negative when dependent variables are ROE, EPS and 
Tobin Q respectively. This result indicates compared with non-state-owned 
companies, institutional investors play relatively weaker role in state-owned 
companies. Because of complex organization structures and unclear property 
rights, state-owned companies curb institutional investors’ active 
participation in corporate governance. Compared with high difficulty and 
cost in participating state-owned corporate governance, institutional 
investors better play the role of supervision and corporate governance, and 
correspondingly have more positive impact on corporate performance in 
non-stated-owned companies. These results prove hypothesis 3. 
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Table 6 regression results of testing hypotheses 3 
      Dependent varaibles 
 
Independent variables 
ROE EPS Tobin Q 
 coefficient T value coefficient T value coefficient T value 
Constant -0.532*** -11.109 -2.044*** -15.731 19.980*** 27.279 
INS 0.474** 2.369 2.054*** 3.784 2.265 0.467 
STATE -0.028*** -5.086 -0.104*** -6.856 -0.054* -1.751 
SIZE 0.011*** 3.594 0.007*** 8.431 -0.780*** -16.378 
GROWTH 0.001 1.455 0.001 0.507 -0.002 -0.250 
AUDIT 0.142*** 9.590 0.142*** 3.530 -2.319*** -9.994 
LEV -0.008 -1.368 -0.132*** -8.223 2.337*** 22.309 
IND      Control Control Control 
Year  Control Control Control 
F-value 46.816 63.300 184.227 
Adj-R2 0.155 0.172 0.189 
***significant at the 1% level   **significant at the 5% level   *significant at the 10% level 
 
Table 7 regression results of testing hypotheses 3 
      Dependent varaibles 
 
Independent variables 
ROE EPS Tobin Q 
 coefficient T value coefficient T value coefficient T value 
Constant -0.545*** -11.157 -2.081*** -15.655 20.225*** 27.101 
INS 0.510** 2.549 2.184*** 4.022 2.179 0.699 
STATE -0.045*** -4.122 -0.117*** -6.332 -0.085*** -3.012 
INS*STATE -0.065*** -5.030 -0.228*** -6.454 -0.094*** -3.120 
SIZE 0.011*** 3.573 0.007*** 8.308 -0.809*** -16.615 
GROWTH 0.001 1.460 0.001 0.519 -0.002 -0.234 
AUDIT 0.142*** 9.591 0.143*** 3.538 -2.316*** -9.983 
LEV -0.008 -1.334 -0.132*** -8.201 2.328*** 22.127 
IND      Control Control Control 
Year  Control Control Control 
F-value 46.744 62.585 184.495 
Adj-R2 0.155 0.102 0.190 
***significant at the 1% level   **significant at the 5% level   *significant at the 10% level 
 
7. Sensitivity tests 
 Table 8 exhibits sensitivity tests results using ROA as dependent 
variable. From the table, we can see the proportion of institutional investors 
is significantly positively related to corporate return on asset. This means 
Chinese institutional investors are actively influencing corporate 
performance. This further proves active governance role institutional 
investors are playing. When we use return on asset as performance indicator, 
the degree of counter balance between institutional investors and the large 
shareholders is also positively related to ROA. This means the higher 
institutional investors’ stake relative to the big shareholder, the more 
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incentives they have to participate in corporate governance process, and 
prevent big shareholders from exploiting the rights and interests of minority 
shareholders, and correspondingly improve corporate performance. This 
conclusion further supports hypothesis 2. When we use return on asset as 
performance indicator, the regression coefficient of cross-term INS*STATE 
is -0.014, and significant at 10% statistic level. The regression coefficient of 
STATE is -0.012 and significant at 10% statistic level. These results show 
the state nature of controlling shareholders has negative impact on corporate 
performance. The state nature of controlling shareholders restrain 
institutional investors’ governance role. Compared with state-owned 
companies, institutional investors more actively participate in corporate 
governance of non-state-owned companies. Therefore, relative to state-
owned companies, institutional investors have much more performance 
effect in non-state-owned companies. All these sensitivity tests further 
support hypothesis 1, 2 and 3. 
Table 8 sensitivity tests results using ROA as dependent variable 
      Hypothesis 
 
Independent variables 
H1 H2 H3 
 coefficient T value coefficient T value coefficient T value 
Constant -0.170 -1.293 0.494*** 6.932 0.447*** 5.838 
INS 1.951*** 4.786   -1.932*** -6.166 
CB   0.126*** 4.180   
STATE     -0.012* -1.895 
INS*STATE     -0.014* -1.898 
SIZE 0.019*** 3.177 0.020*** 4.251 0.021*** 4.172 
GROWTH 0.001 0.211 0.001 0.257 0.000 0.249 
AUDIT -0.094*** -3.121 -0.094*** -4.036 -0.093*** -4.030 
LEV -0.054*** -4.493 -0.054*** -5.868 -0.054*** -5.814 
IND      Control Control Control 
Year  Control Control Control 
F-value 15.52 15.463       13.307 
Adj-R2 0.119 0.119 0.116 
***significant at the 1% level   **significant at the 5% level   *significant at the 10% level 
 
8. Conclusions 
 This study tries to answer whether Chinese institutional investors 
exert performance and governance effect on publicly listed companies. 
Based on a series of descriptive statistics and regression analyses, our 
empirical study draws the following conclusions: 
(1) Institutional investors’ holding is significantly positively related to 
corporate performance. The empirical results show when institutional 
investors have higher stake in companies, they tend to engage in 
corporate governance and daily management to improve corporate 
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performance. And correspondingly they achieve higher return on their 
investment. 
(2) When the degree of counter balance between institutional investors and 
the first big shareholder is higher, the corporate perform relatively better. 
Compared with the majority shareholders, the greater institutional 
investors’ stakes are in companies, the more voting rights they have in 
corporate governance, management and decision-making activities. 
Correspondingly they enhance corporate performance effect. 
(3) Compared with state-owned companies, institutional investors exert 
greater performance influence on non-state-owned companies. Because 
of dominant state equity structure and strong position of governments, it 
is difficult for institutional investors to participate in corporate 
governance in state-owned companies. Hence the nature of state- 
controlling inhibits corporate governance effect of institutional investors. 
In the non-state-owned companies, institutional investors are better 
qualified for the role of the supervisor. It is easier for them to monitor 
corporate management and participate in corporate governance. Thus 
institutional investors more effectively improve the level of corporate 
governance and corporate performance. Therefore, relative to state 
holding listed companies, institutional investors’ holdings in non-state-
owned listed companies perform better. 
 Empirical evidence shows that institutional investors can improve 
financial performance of listed companies. But on the whole, Chinese 
institutional investors are not enough developed such as fewer kinds of 
institutional investors and lack of scale advantages. Arising from weak 
strength of institutional investors, it is difficult for them to fully play the role 
of corporate governance. Therefore it is urgent to improve legal and 
institutional environment to promote the development of Chinese 
institutional investors. 
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